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Was the 2007-2008 global financial crisis (the “financial crisis”) the
cause of credit unavailability, or was it the effect? The standard story is that
the financial crisis resulted in the loss of credit availability. 3 I will argue
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today that story is reversed. I will also examine what lessons that can teach
us.

I. CAUSE AND EFFECT

To best assess cause and effect, consider the timeline of events
leading to the financial crisis. As home prices steadily increased in the new
century, it became common for lenders to make mortgage loans to even
risky, or “subprime,” borrowers. This lending followed a time-tested creditcard model, in which credit is made easily available and high interest rates
are charged in order to statistically offset losses. The subprime mortgagelending was even regarded by some as more conservative than the creditcard model because mortgage lenders have not only one way out—cash
flow—but also a second way out—collateral; and expected home
appreciation meant that collateral values would increase and borrowers
would also be able to repay through refinancing.

This model worked well so long as home prices continued to rise. The
model was also consistent with the U.S. government’s strong encouragement
of lenders to make mortgage loans to low-income—and often
“disproportionately minority”—borrowers. Sometimes the subprime
mortgage-lending occurred without full documentation of borrower income,
recognizing, at least implicitly, that many seemingly low-income borrowers
are actually paid on a cash basis, without officially declaring their income.

https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp1047.pdf (stating that “the crisis was
unprecedented in its global scale and severity, hindering credit access to businesses,
households and banks”).
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To that extent, not completely unlike the argument by renowned Peruvian
economist Hernando de Soto that de facto property rights should be
recognized in order to enable the poor to borrow and acquire capital, 4 the
model allowed de facto income to be recognized to enable the poor to
borrow money and acquire homes.

But when home prices began declining, these subprime borrowers
could not refinance; and in many cases, they defaulted. Even borrowers who
could afford to pay their mortgage loans were tempted to walk away as
mortgage loans exceeded home values. These mortgage defaults in turn
caused substantial amounts of low investment-grade mortgage-backed
securities to default and some AAA-rated securities to be downgraded. 5 The
defaults were especially large for certain highly leveraged securities, 6 which
were indirectly backed by subprime mortgages; full payment of even the
senior classes of these securities was extremely sensitive to cash-flow
variations and dependent on the (failed) assumption that housing prices
would continue to appreciate. 7

These defaults and downgradings of rated securities, in turn, spooked
investors who believed that AAA meant ironclad safety and that investment
grade meant relative freedom from default. Investors started losing
confidence in ratings and avoiding debt securities. Fewer investors meant
4

HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000).
5
For a description of credit ratings and rating agencies, see infra Part II.C.1.
6
These were called “ABS CDO” securities.
7
Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address: Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis,
60 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW 549 (2009); also available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1288687.
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that the price of debt securities started falling. Falling prices meant that firms
using debt securities as collateral had to mark them to market and put up
cash 8—requiring the sale of more securities—which caused market prices to
plummet further downward in a death spiral. 9 The market prices of
mortgage-backed securities, for example, collapsed substantially below the
intrinsic value of the mortgage-loan assets underlying those securities.

This collapse in market prices meant that banks and other financial
institutions holding mortgage-backed (and other asset-backed) securities had
to write down the securities’ value. That caused institutions holding lots of
these securities—epitomized by Lehman Brothers—to appear more
financially risky, in turn triggering concern over counterparty risk. 10 Afraid
these institutions might default on their contractual obligations, many parties
stopped dealing with them.

The refusal of the U.S. government to save Lehman Brothers in midSeptember 2008, and its resulting bankruptcy, added to the panic. Debt
markets became so spooked that even the short-term commercial paper
markets virtually shut down. Without debt-market financing, which
constitutes approximately 58% of all corporate credit availability, 11

8

For a discussion of marking to market, see infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
The high leverage of many firms appears to have made this death spiral worse.
Encouraged by the earlier liquidity glut, many firms had borrowed excessively because
the cost of funds was so cheap.
10
Counterparty risk refers to the risk that a party obligated on a contract may default
paying another party to the contract.
11
Silvio Contessi, Li Li, & Kathryn Russ, Bank vs. Bond Financing Over the Business
Cycle, 31 ECONOMIC SYNOPSES 1, 1 (2013), available at
https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/es/13/ES_31_2013-11-15.pdf. By comparison,
9
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companies lacked money to expand and sometimes even to pay current
expenses. 12 The economy collapsed.

In short, although the relationship between credit availability and
financial decline leading to the crisis was somewhat interactive, a loss of
credit availability appears to have caused the financial crisis more than the
reverse. 13 If that non-standard story is true, what lessons can it teach us?

II. LESSONS

I believe there are at least three lessons, all focused on protecting
credit availability: because credit availability is dependent on financial
markets as well as banks, regulation should be designed to protect the
viability of markets as well as banks; more diversified sources of credit
availability might increase financial stability; and regulators should try to
identify and correct system-wide flaws in making credit available.

A. Markets as well as Banks Should be Protected

bank loans make up only about 10% of corporate credit availability. Id. These estimates
are based on 2003-2013 data. Id.
12
See, e.g., Fiorella De Fiore & Harald Uhlig, Corporate Debt Structure and the
Financial Crisis, at 2, https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2012/paper_429.pdf
(“the implication of the turmoil for economic activity [during the financial crisis] was a
drop in investment and output that was unprecedented”).
13
This conclusion appears to be consistent with Hayek’s monetary theory that a
contraction in bank lending results in declining economic output, unemployment, and a
recession or even depression. See David Bholat, Money, Bank Debt, and Business Cycles:
Between Economic Development and Financial Crises, in AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT AND
SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN A TIME OF CRISIS, supra note 3, at 28 (discussing Hayek’s
monetary theory).
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In our market-intermediated financial system where, at least in the
United States, companies today obtain much of their financing directly
through capital markets, 14 credit availability is dependent on financial
markets as well as banks. Therefore regulation should be designed to protect
the viability of markets as well as banks. 15 Consider how that could be done.

Government central banks traditionally have used liquidity, such as
making emergency loans, to help prevent banks in their country from
defaulting. The Federal Reserve, for example, has had this role of lender of
last resort to U.S. banks—although, perversely, the Dodd-Frank Act limited
the Fed’s power to engage in this role. 16 The European Central Bank has
helped to recapitalize European banks exposed to sovereign-debt risk. 17

14

See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
The efforts being made to protect bank viability are beyond the scope of my Address.
As a brief summary, though, in the aftermath of the financial crisis the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision adopted new capital-adequacy rules to better absorb and spread
the effects of losses by banks. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, RISK
MANAGEMENT MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES § 2.1-2 (2015). Similarly, post-crisis
regulation in both the United Kingdom and the United States requires deposit-taking
banks to adopt forms of “ring-fencing,” restricting risky activities. See Steven L.
Schwarcz, Ring-Fencing, 87 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 69, 78 (2014); also
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2228742. In the United Kingdom, ring-fencing for
banks was first proposed by the 2011 Vickers Report. Id. at 78–79. In the United States,
ring-fencing is enshrined in the Volcker Rule. Id. at 80–81.
16
The Dodd-Frank Act sharply limits the power of the Federal Reserve to make
emergency loans to individual or insolvent financial firms. That categorical limitation
appears somewhat excessive, if not dangerous; a lender of last resort can be an important
safeguard if it acts judiciously.
17
See, e.g., Marius A. Boewe et al., The European Central Debt Crisis – Paving the Way
Towards Financial Stability, J. BANKR. L. 2012.01-5 (observing that “the European
Central Bank (“ECB”) started to purchase sovereign debt [from European banks] and
continued to accept sovereign debt as collateral without haircuts”).
15
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Liquidity can also be used to stabilize systemically important financial
markets. 18

For example, in response to the post-Lehman collapse of the
commercial paper market, the U.S. Federal Reserve created the Commercial
Paper Funding Facility (“CPFF”) to act as a temporary lender of last resort
for that market, with the goal of addressing “temporary liquidity distortions”
by purchasing commercial paper from highly rated issuers that could not
otherwise sell their paper. 19 The CPFF apparently helped to stabilize the
commercial paper market. 20

Regulators should consider institutionalizing liquidity to stabilize
systemically important financial markets. To mitigate moral hazard, at least
part of the source of liquidity could be privatized. 21 Flexible pricing
approaches used in structured financing transactions could also be adapted to
calculate the purchase price of market securities at levels that stabilize
markets without fostering moral hazard. 22 This type of targeted approach to

18

I first proposed this in Systemic Risk, 97 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 193, 225-30
(2008); also available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1008326.
19
See Tobias Adrian, Karin Kimbrough, & Dina Marchioni, The Federal Reserve’s
Commercial Paper Funding Facility, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REPORT NO.
423 (April 1, 2010).
20
Id. at 11 (concluding that “[t]he CPFF indeed had a stabilizing effect on the
commercial paper market”).
21
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and Limits of Law,
2012 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 815, 829-30; also available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2016434.
22
Id. at 833. For example, assume that the intrinsic value—effectively the present value
of the expected value of the underlying cash flows—of a type of mortgage-backed
security is estimated to be in the range of 80 cents on the dollar. If, due to panic, the
market price of those securities had fallen significantly below that number, say, to 20
cents on the dollar, a liquidity provider could purchase these securities at, say, 60 cents
Credit Unavailability.docxCredit Unavailability.docx
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use liquidity to stabilize panicked financial markets is fundamentally
different from quantitative easing (“QE”), which refers to a central bank
purchasing government (and sometimes other) securities as a form of
monetary policy, in order to hold down interest rates. 23

B. Credit Sources Should be Diversified
Diversifying sources of credit availability might increase financial
stability. My analysis below assumes that each diversified credit source is
robust and that it does not create an incentive-distorting liquidity glut24 or
inappropriately weaken central bank control over monetary policy.

Consider, for example, the European Commission’s proposed Capital
Markets Union (“CMU”), which has the goal of reforming the European
financial system to help build an integrated European capital market by

on the dollar, thereby stabilizing the market and still making a profit. To induce a holder
of the mortgage-backed securities to sell at that price, the liquidity provider could, for
example, agree to pay a higher deferred purchase price if the securities turn out to be
worth more than expected. This is just one (simplified) example of the flexible pricing
approaches used in structured financing transactions to buy financial assets of uncertain
value which could be adapted to a liquidity provider’s purchases.
23
The Economist explains: What is quantitative easing?, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/03/economist-explains-5;
Larry Elliott, Quantitative easing, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2009),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/oct/14/businessglossary. QE has been used
extensively by central banks during and after the financial crisis. The logic of QE is
simple supply and demand: government purchases of securities increases demand (and
price) for those securities, enabling issuers of the securities to hold down the interest rate
thereon. See Quantitative easing – Frequently Asked Questions, BANK OF ENGLAND,
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/Pages/qe/qe_faqs.aspx.
24
Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime
Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 373, 395 (2008); also available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1107444 (discussing how excessively easy credit distorted
incentives prior to the financial crisis).
Credit Unavailability.docxCredit Unavailability.docx

9

2019.25 Such a capital market is expected to increase business financing and,
more relevant to my talk today, to diversify it beyond bank lending 26—
which currently represents around 80% of European corporate debt
financing. 27

The CMU focuses on securitization (in Europe spelled securitisation)
as one of the central sources of diversified credit. In a typical securitization
transaction, a sponsor will either originate a pool of loans or other rights to
payment, or purchase those types of financial assets from other originators
(such as mortgage lenders), and sell them for cash to a special purpose entity
(“SPE”). To raise the cash, the SPE issues securities to investors, repayable
from the periodic financial asset payments. Securitization thus enables
lenders to multiply their available funding by selling existing loans for cash,
which can be used to make new loans. Otherwise lenders would have to
carry the loans on their books and recoup the principal over many years. 28

Used legitimately, securitization became “one of the dominant means
of capital formation” in the United States and abroad. 29 In 2007, for

25

See European Commission, Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union, SWD
(2015) 183 final (2015).
26
See European Commission, Green Paper, Building a Capital Markets Union at 4, 10
SWD (2015) 13 (final, Feb. 2015).
27
Kira Brecht, How U.S. and EU Capital Markets are Different (Oct. 29, 2015), available
at http://openmarkets.cmegroup.com/10431/how-u-s-and-eu-capital-markets-aredifferent.
28
See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, What is Securitization? And for What Purpose?, 85
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 1283, 1295-98 (2012); also available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1996670.
29
Investment Company Act, Release No. 19105, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) P 85,062, at 83,500 (Nov. 19, 1992) (in which the U.S. Securities and
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example, the volume of European securitization approximated €595
billion. 30 During that period, the volume of securitization in the United
States approximated $11.2 trillion. 31

The levels of securitization dropped precipitously, however, with
recognition that its abuses contributed to the financial crisis. By 2015, for
example, the volume of European securitization was only €214 billion 32 and
the volume of U.S. securitization was relatively lower, only $1.9 trillion. 33
Securitization’s abuses centered around the highly leveraged securities,
already mentioned, which were extremely sensitive to cash-flow variations
and overly dependent on collateral-value assumptions. 34

The revival of securitization—and thus the CMU’s goal to further
facilitate securitization as a source of capital market financing—will depend
on preventing future such abuses. To accomplish that, the European
Commission is proposing a framework for what it calls simple, transparent,

Exchange Commission described securitization as “becoming one of the dominant means
of capital formation in the United States”).
30
Association of Financial Markets in Europe (AFME), Securitisation Data Report for
Q1 2016, at 7, available at www.afme.eu.
31
This figure is based on data for 2008 from the Securities Industry and Financial
Markets Association website, http://www.sifma.org/.
32
AFME, supra note 30.
33
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association Press Release, “SIFMA Issues
2015 Securitization Year in Review” (Apr. 7, 2016), available at
http://www.sifma.org/newsroom/2016/sifma-issues-2015-securitization-year-in-review/.
34
See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Cf. What is Securitization?, supra note 28, at
1285 (discussing why these securities defaulted or had their credit ratings downgraded).
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and standardised (“STS”) securitization, which is designed to increase
reliability and investor confidence. 35

C. System-Wide Flaws Should be Identified and Corrected
Regulators should try to identify and correct system-wide flaws in
making credit available. Consider the following potential flaws.

1. Overreliance on Credit Ratings. A credit rating is a formal
assessment of a borrower’s ability to pay its debts, expressed by private forprofit companies—known as “rating agencies”—through an ordinal ranking
system. 36 In general, the higher the rating, the more likely the borrower is to
pay its liabilities. 37 Because of their simplicity and public availability, credit
ratings can perform a public good, helping to close the information gap
between borrowers and lenders. 38 Further, credit ratings also serve a de facto
“certification” function by allowing investors to compare the
creditworthiness of debt securities with different risk characteristics. 39

35

See European Commission, Capital Markets Union: First Status Report, SWD (2016)
147 final, at 21 (Apr. 25, 2016). I have elsewhere argued that the United States should
adopt a similar securitization framework. See Securitization and Post-Crisis Financial
Regulation, 101 CORNELL L REV. ONLINE 115, 125-26 & 138 (2016).
36
PRAGYAN DEB, MARK MANNING, GARETH MURPHY, ADRIAN PENALVER & ARON TOTH,
BANK OF ENG., WHITHER THE CREDIT RATINGS INDUSTRY? 4 (2011),
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Documents/fpc/fspapers/fs_paper09.p
df. For example, Moody’s represents the most creditworthy instruments as Aaa, the next
most creditworthy as Aa, then to A, then to Baa, and so on. Ratings Definitions,
MOODY’S, https://www.moodys.com/Pages/amr002002.aspx.
37
DEB ET AL., supra note 36, at 4. The highest rated securities are deemed “investmentgrade,” while the lowest rated are called “non-investment grade,” or “junk.” Bond
ratings, FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/learning-center/investment-products/fixedincome-bonds/bond-ratings
38
See DEB ET AL., supra note 36, at 4.
39
Id. at 5–6.
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Investors both in the United States and abroad came to rely on credit
ratings as simple tools to assist in making investment decisions. 40 Because of
their widespread use, 41 however, many investors overrelied on credit ratings.
Prior to the financial crisis, for example, investors often relied exclusively
on credit ratings without performing independent credit examinations. 42
Such exclusive reliance reflected a faith “in the accuracy of credit ratings
[that] was reinforced by their long record of reliability for assessing the
creditworthiness of borrowers under relatively simple debt instruments, such
as corporate bonds and basic securitization instruments.” 43

This faith remained steadfast even as credit ratings were applied to
much more complex, highly leveraged, and novel instruments, such as ABS
CDO securities, 44 without historical performance data. 45 But the faith was
badly shaken when “the rating methodologies utilized for . . . [those]
securities produced inaccurate ratings.” 46 The resulting loss of investor
confidence caused a collapse of the market for virtually all debt securities,
and a corresponding collapse of credit. 47

This overreliance on credit ratings even when extrapolated far beyond
their normal use, and the resulting collapse of credit caused by the loss of
40

Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox,
2002 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW 1, 3.
41
See id.
42
See Steven L. Schwarcz & Lucy Chang, The Custom to Failure Cycle, 62 DUKE LAW
JOURNAL 767, 773 (2012) (“at least until the global financial crisis, financial firms rarely
questioned the accuracy of [credit] ratings”).
43
Id.
44
See supra note 6 and accompanying text (defining these securities).
45
Schwarcz & Chang, supra note 42, at 773–75.
46
Id. at 777.
47
See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
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faith in ratings even when normally applied, illustrates a system-wide flaw
in making credit available. How can regulators try to correct this flaw?

One approach might be to require “periodic self-awareness and
reporting” from the financial community of the limitations of credit ratings
and their potential for failure. 48 This requirement would be especially
valuable when extrapolating existing ratings methodologies to novel
financial products. 49

Another approach might be simply to try to demystify credit ratings,
reducing the blind faith that can cause overreliance. The Dodd-Frank Act
implicitly attempts to do that by requiring the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission to adopt new rules requiring disclosure of rating
methodologies, 50 thereby increasing the transparency of the rating process.
This enables investors themselves to better understand the limitations, as
well as benefits, of credit ratings. 51

48

Schwarcz & Chang, supra note 42, at 783. A similar requirement was passed as part of
the Basel III capital adequacy guidelines, whereby banks are required “to engage in
periodic financial ‘stress’ scenarios, in order to motivate them to consider the possibility
of, and to better prepare for, future periods when previously adequate liquidity and
capital resources might prove inadequate.” Id. at 782–83. Further, the Dodd-Frank Act
“requires banks and other systemically important financial institutions to plan for the
possibility of their liquidation.” Id. at 783.
49
Id.
50
Credit Rating Agencies, SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/creditratingagencies.shtml.
51
See Gregory A. Fernicola & Joshua B. Goldstein, Credit Rating Agencies, SKADDEN, at
1–2, https://www.skadden.com/newsletters/FSR_Credit_Rating_Agencies.pdf (“To
increase transparency in the ratings process, rating agencies will be required to use a
standardized form to publicly disclose their rating methodology, a description of issuer
data considered in the rating process and any additional information that the SEC may
require.”).
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2. Marking-to-Market in Crisis Conditions. Marking-to-market is
widely considered to protect against declines in market value. In turbulent or
panicked markets, however, it can reduce credit availability and exacerbate
the panic.

In its simplest form, marking-to-market refers to the common
regulatory requirement that a securities account be adjusted in response to a
change in the market value of the securities. 52 An investor, for example, may
buy securities on credit from a securities broker-dealer, securing the
purchase price by pledging the securities as collateral. To guard against the
price of the securities falling to the point where their value as collateral is
insufficient to repay the purchase price, the broker-dealer requires the
investor to maintain a minimum collateral value. If the market value of the
securities falls below this minimum, the broker-dealer will issue a “margin
call” requiring the investor to deposit additional collateral, usually in the
form of money or additional securities, to satisfy this minimum. Failure to
do so triggers a default, enabling the broker-dealer to foreclose on the
collateral. 53

Requiring investors to “mark to market” in this fashion is generally
believed to reduce risk. 54 Nonetheless, it can cause “perverse effects on

52

This discussion of marking-to-market is based on Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating
Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 211, 23233 (2009); also available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1240863.
53
Id. See also ZVI BODIE, ALEX KANE & ALAN J. MARCUS, INVESTMENTS 71–72 (8th ed.
2008).
54
See, e.g., Gikas A. Hardouvelis & Panayiotis Theodossiou, The Asymmetric
Relationship Between Initial Margin Requirements and Stock Market Volatility Across
Bull and Bear Markets, 15 REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 1525, 1554–55 (2002)
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systemic stability” during times of market volatility, when forcing sales of
assets to meet margin calls can depress asset prices, requiring more forced
sales (which, in turn, will depress asset prices even more), causing a
downward spiral. 55 The existence of leverage makes this spiral more likely
and amplifies it if it occurs. 56 At least some portion of the financial crisis
appears to have resulted from this downward spiral. 57

Marking-to-market’s inadvertent undermining of financial stability is
due in part to nonlinear feedback effects and tight coupling. 58 Nonlinearity
results when “interactions among components of a system are not directly
proportional.” 59 Similarly, a “tightly coupled system is one that is highly
interdependent, so that a disturbance to one part of the system can spread
almost instantaneously to other parts of the system.” 60 In a downward

(finding a correlation between higher margin calls and decreased systemic risk, and
speculating that higher margin calls may bleed the irrationality out of the market until
only sound bets are left).
55
Rodrigo Cifuentes, Gianluigi Ferrucci & Hyun Song Shin, Liquidity Risk and
Contagion 2 (Bank of Eng. Working Paper No. 264, 2005), available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ publications/workingpapers/wp264.pdf); see also
Clifford De Souza & Mikhail Smirnov, Dynamic Leverage: A Contingent Claims
Approach to Leverage for Capital Conservation, JOURNAL OF PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT,
Fall 2004, at 25, 28 (arguing that, in a bad market, short-term pressure to sell assets to
raise cash for margin calls can lead to further mark-to-market losses for remaining assets,
which triggers a whole new wave of selling, the process repeating itself until markets
improve or the firm is wiped out; and referring to this process as a “Critical Liquidation
Cycle”).
56
De Souza & Smirnov, supra note 55, at 26–27.
57
See supra note 9 and accompanying text. See also Rachel Evans, Banks Tell of
Downward Spiral, 27 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW REVIEW 16 (June 2008).
58
Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 52, at 232–33.
59
Virginia R. Burkett et al., Nonlinear Dynamics in Ecosystem Response to Climactic
Change: Case Studies and Policy Implications, 2 JOURNAL OF ECOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY
357, 359 (2005).
60
Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the
Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 75, 94 (2013).
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spiraling asset market, then, the very fact of forced sale of marked-to-market
assets causes the market value of those assets to fall even further, in turn
requiring more marking-to-market. 61 This can create the type of “anomaly,
seen during the [financial] crisis, of securities bearing market values
substantially below their intrinsic values.” 62

Regulators could reduce marking-to-market’s flaws by addressing the
nonlinear feedback effects and tight coupling that cause them. To reduce
nonlinear feedback, for example, regulators could “allow firms to substitute
other measures of investor comfort for marking-to-market” 63 when markingto-market “might distort value, such as when it would require a securities
account—especially an account whose securities have long-term
maturities—to be adjusted in response to short-term pricing fluctuations.” 64
One such measure of investor comfort might be a firm’s “full disclosure of
its underlying asset portfolio.” 65 And to reduce marking-to-market’s tight
coupling, regulators could use liquidity to stabilize systemically important
financial markets impacted by a downward spiraling asset market. 66 Such

61

Cf. RICHARD BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS,
AND THE PERILS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 146 (2007) (observing that “the natural
reaction to [financial] market breakdown is to add layers of protection and regulation. But
trying to regulate a market entangled by complexity can lead to unintended
consequences, compounding crises rather than extinguishing them because the safeguards
add even more complexity, which in turn feeds more failure.”).
62
Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 52, at 247.
63
Id. at 246.
64
Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 60, at 119.
65
Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 52, at 246–47.
66
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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liquidity might be provided by the type of market lender of last resort
previously discussed. 67

3. Inherent Human Limitations. I have so far discussed system-wide
flaws in making credit available that are part of the design of the financial
system. In theory at least, the system can be redesigned to correct them.
Another type of system-wide flaw is much more intractable: our inherent
human limitations. 68

For example, we often implicitly simplify our perception of reality as
a psychological coping mechanism, including a tendency to define future
events by the recent past. This flaw has particular application to credit
availability. In this context, consider certain parallels between the Great
Depression and the financial crisis, which illustrate how the flaw might
temporarily increase but ultimately destroy credit availability.

In the years preceding the Great Depression, banks lending “on
margin”—a practice in which borrowers use proceeds of a loan to purchase
shares of stock and then pledge that stock as collateral to the banks—
assumed they were adequately protected, even for margin loans made to

67

See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. Cf. Regulating Complexity in Financial
Markets, supra note 52, at 246–47 (discussing using such a market liquidity provider to
“more loosely couple the feedback effects”) & at 247–56 (generally discussing providing
liquidity to systemically important financial markets).
68
For a more comprehensive discussion of how human limitations can impair financial
regulation, see Steven L. Schwarcz, “Regulating Complacency: Human Limitations on
Legal Efficacy” (draft on file with author).
Credit Unavailability.docxCredit Unavailability.docx

18

risky borrowers. 69 Although these loans were not initially
overcollateralized—because the value of the pledged stock initially equaled,
but did not exceed, the amount of the loan—banks expected the stock market
to continue rising, as it had for decades. That expectation reflects the
tendency to define future events by the recent past. An increase in stock
prices, and thus a consequent increase in the value of the collateral, would
then cause the loans to become overcollateralized. 70 Beginning in October
1929, however, the decline in stock prices caused many of those risky
borrowers to default on their now-undercollateralized margin loans. 71 That,
in turn, caused margin-lending banks to begin defaulting, triggering a
banking collapse that ultimately wiped out credit.

Similarly, prior to the financial crisis, institutions that made mortgage
loans to subprime borrowers assumed, as mentioned, that they were
adequately protected. 72 They expected housing prices to continue rising, as
had been the case for decades. 73 That expectation again reflects the tendency
to define future events by the recent past. An increase in housing prices, and
thus a consequent increase in the value of the collateral, would then cause
the loans to become overcollateralized. 74 In the fall of 2007, however, the
decline in housing prices caused many subprime borrowers to begin

69

Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an
Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 1349, 1356 (2011); also available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1735025.
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defaulting on their now-undercollateralized mortgage loans. 75 As
discussed, 76 that started the timeline of events that caused the shutdown of
debt markets and the resulting financial crisis.

We do not yet, and may never, understand our human limitations well
enough to correct them. If we cannot correct these limitations, they will
continue to threaten credit unavailability and resulting financial crises.

III. CONCLUSION

Although the standard story is that the financial crisis resulted in the
loss of credit availability, I have argued that a loss of credit availability
appears to have caused the financial crisis more than the reverse. If that
argument is correct, what lessons can it teach us?

There are at least three. First, in our market-intermediated financial
system, credit availability is dependent on financial markets as well as
banks. Therefore financial regulation should be designed to protect the
viability of markets as well as banks. Second, diversifying credit sources
might increase financial stability. Third, we should try to identify and correct
system-wide flaws that can undermine credit availability.
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Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 69, at 1360 (“When home prices began falling,
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One of the most intractable of these flaws is our own inherent human
limitations, which we can do little to correct. That suggests an ongoing risk
for credit availability, and thus an ongoing potential for new financial crises
to arise. Although addressing that risk and crisis-potential is a story for
another day, Professor Iman Anabtawi and I begin to address it in a separate
article. 77 Because financial failure is inevitable, we argue that financial
regulation should be designed not only to prevent failures but also to work
ex post—after a systemic shock has been triggered and is being
transmitted—to try to stabilize the afflicted financial system. Our approach
takes inspiration from chaos theory, insofar as that theory holds that
remedies should also focus on limiting the consequences of failures.
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